International Law of Armed Conflict and Computer Network Attack: Developing the Rules of Engagement by O\u27Donnell, Brian T. & Kraska, James C.
International Law of Armed Conflict and 
Computer Network Attack: 
Developing the Rules of Engagement 
Brian T. O'Donnell and James C. Kraska 
T his chapter offers a framework for military commanders and policy makers to begin constructing rules of engagement (ROE) for computer 
network attack (CNA) during armed conflict, military operations other than 
war, and other overt and covert national security activities. Focused on the op-
erational commander rather than the academic, it introduces the legal and policy 
considerations surrounding the drafting of ROE for CNA, and discusses the 
unique legal issues that arise from CNA "vithin the law of armed conflict. Such 
considerations are important for military commanders, their operators, planners, 
and lawyers in designing and employing CNA because they serve to facilitate 
and provide guidance that operationalizes the concept of computer network 
attack-removing it from the realm of speculation and placing it as a tool in the 
hands of military commanders. Moreover, since legal and ROE decisions im-
pact the development of tactics and doctrine, and the acquisition and force 
structure processes, the discussion is relevant to force providers and trainers, as 
well as fleet commanders. 
Computer Network Attack: Developing the Rules of Engagement 
Emerging Technologies and War 
Over the last decade, information technologies, including computer and 
communications systems, have brought about a sea change in the global econ-
omy. Technology has grown fromjust 6% of the US economy at the beginning 
of the 1990s, to over 20% today.1 What was once a narrow "technology" sector 
within the whole economy has emerged as the "New Economy," comprised of 
that third or fourth of the economy that serves as the source of rapid innovation 
and engine of economic growth.2 Entire subsectors of the New Economy have 
emerged, and whole new industries have grown virtually overnight: photonics, 
micro-electrical mechanical (MEMs) devices, wireless systems and specialty 
communications semiconductors, and, of course, the Internet, which has be-
come omnipresent throughout the economy. The New Economy has trans-
formed industry data management and storage, manufacturing, accounting, and 
inventory management. Many of the same technologies have even more dra-
matically recast military communications, command and control, targeting, lo-
gistics and weapons.3 These technological changes are transforming thinking 
about military force structure and doctrine, and have opened up computer net-
work attack as a viable instrument of military power. 
Military technology displayed by coalition forces during the Gulf War in 
1991, particularly those technologies that were used by the United States mil-
itary, ignited broad interest among strategists and pollcymakers world\vide in 
how to best develop or channel the emerging "revolution in military affairs" 
(RMA).4 RMA, which encompasses technologies that "gather, process and 
fuse information on a large geographical area in real time, all the time,"5 has 
driven the creation of new military capabilities and doctrine based on ad-
vanced concepts and emerging technologies. It grew from Cold War plan-
ning in the West that sought to apply technology as a force multiplier to 
counter numerically superior Soviet forces in Europe.6 Mter the Cold War, 
RMA began to be seen as a way to ensure Western superiority, or at least pre-
serve military advantage, in a broad variety of post-Cold War conflicts that 
might be encountered within the context of a resource-constrained defense 
budget environment. Computer network attack is one of the latest and most 
advanced manifestations of RMA. With the growth of computer networks 
and integrated systems, computers have assumed a central role in enabling 
both offensive and defensive military operations. Despite \videspread recogni-
tion that the technologies that enable computer network attack are already a 
reality, the specific legal and policy considerations that will control their em-
ployment have received scant attention. This is not surprising, since the 
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development of concrete legal analysis tends to lag the advancement in tech-
nology, particularly in the application of international law to new methods of 
warfare? It is equally important to recall that history is replete with examples 
in which superior military technology was squandered, and advantage was 
surrendered, because the army employing the new weapon had an inattentive 
or feckless approach to developing corresponding doctrine and tactics for its 
employment.8 In the modern era, the. development of appropriate ROE for 
CNA, along with operational doctrine, tactics, and force structure, will deter-
mine whether CNA is an effective weapon. 
In the mid-1990s, the initial US focus on computers and military conflict 
resided almost exclusively in defending perceived weaknesses and vulnerabili-
ties in critical national information infrastructure--especially electronic bank-
ing, communications, and industrial energy grids. This focus, which emerged 
within the Department of Defense (DoD) as "Information Warfare--Defense" 
(IWD) was replicated by other governmental agencies, who also became con-
cerned after 1995 about the vulnerability of their networks, coinciding with 
the widespread use of the Internet.9 All of these efforts migrated under the um-
brella term, "Computer Network Defense" (CND), which has served to con-
centrate interagency resources and attention toward protecting and defending 
critical computer and information networks from sabotage by individual hack-
ers, terrorist groups, and unfriendly governments.1O Planning for CND was ac-
celerated with the advent of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) in 
May 1998, which ordered federal agencies, in concert with the private sector 
and state and local authorities, to create defenses against attacks on critical in-
frastructures from network assaults from all State and non-State actors that po-
tentially threaten American "national and economic security."l1 The DoD 
responded by standing up the Joint Task Force Computer Network Defense 
OTF-CND), which was renamed Joint Task Force Computer Network Oper-
ations OTF-CNO).12 The JTF is assigned to Commander-in-Chief, United 
States Space Command, but has representatives from each military service and 
many government agencies.13 The CND movement has made great progress 
in identifYing information infrastructure vulnerabilities, and organizing and 
resourcing defensive interagency plans to address them. Initial panic at per-
ceived gaping holes in critical information infrastructure has recendy given 
way to a more measured and sober, and more confident, vulnerability assess-
ment. Now that the concern over CND has stabilized, US planners, particu-
larly in the military, have begun to more seriously consider the potential 
advantages to be gained in military operations by offensive attack against an ad-
versary's information infrastructure. 
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Computer Network AHack 
Computer network attack has emerged as one of the more promising tools 
available to a military commander for mission accomplishment and self-defense. 
It encompasses activities designed to " ... disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy in-
formation resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and 
networks themselves. "14 While the legality of information warfare generally, or 
CNA in particular, is very fact-dependent and open to considerable debate, it 
has received at least some attention among international law scholars. Some 
scholars maintain that a CNA constitutes a use of force, whereas other scholars 
maintain that CNA is much more akin to adverse nonforceable influence.1S This 
debate is healthy and serves to shape the international law in the area. 
Despite the importance of CNA, military and civilian commanders have 
been unable to adequately explain it, or to achieve a consensus in designing 
CNA ROE. Moreover, military staff judge advocates, civilian lawyers ,vithin 
the national security and intelligence establishment, and academics are grappling 
with how to best articulate the legal and policy underpinnings for computer net-
work attack decisions. 
While theories and approaches that emerge from academia are useful to na-
tional decision-makers contending with these issues, they may be of limited 
value to operational commanders, including those at the Navy fleet and battle 
group levels. For the operational commanders, the legal and policy research sur-
rounding CNA often raises more questions than it answers. This results in leav-
ing those commanders who might integrate CNA into real-world operations 
confused and frustrated. Rather than offering a theoretical legal model for CNA, 
this chapter accepts the premise that CNA is quickly becoming a reality. There is 
a broad range of capabilities to attack computer networks that are in various 
stages of development, testing, and training, both in the United States and 
abroad. There is evidence that they are already being employed in actual opera-
tions by a growing number of nations. Furthermore, as these capabilities become 
better understood and easier to use, it is likely that the approval authority to em-
ploy them will gravitate downward in the chain of command to task force com-
manders. Eventually, proven methods of CNA could be authorized to 
individual units and platforms. This chapter presents a question of first impres-
sion by examining the development of operational CNA ROE for military op-
erations, and it offers a practical approach to drafting CNA ROE. This pressing 
issue of exactly how a commander begins to approach the legal aspects of devel-
oping and applying CNA in the real world is on the cusp of wide discussions. 
There is a tremendous legal and policy gap-between rapidly advancing CNA 
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technical capabilities emerging from the laboratories-and the legal architecture 
to support them. The advancement of ROE for computer network attack, 
which has not kept pace with these developments, should begin to fill this gap. 
Detennining the ROE process, considerations for creating the parameters of 
CNA engagement, and some guidelines for inclusion in operational orders are 
especially important for operational commanders executing real world missions. 
The commander should be able to understand which computer network and re-
lated military instruments may be used, under what conditions they may be em-
ployed, and to which missions they may be applied. This prevents a commander 
from either employing means or methods that lie beyond the scope of his or her 
authority, and ensures that the he or she does not unnecessarily limit the applica-
tion of CNA because of confusion over the rules governing its use. There is a 
need to discipline and govern the process of development of ROE for CNA. 
The National Command Authorities (NCA) have a central stake in overseeing 
the process to ensure that the emerging CNA rules of engagement comply with 
intemationallaw and domestic legislation, as well as remain in concert with na-
tional military policy and national diplomatic and political goals. 
For this chapter, we assume that some level of CNA is lawful within the 
context of international law, but the more practical question-indeed for 
commanders, the greater question-is how best to develop rules of engage-
ment for an actual operation. The objective is to begin to fill in the vacuum 
pertaining to the control, application, and employment of CNA at the 
warfighting level.16 Does the existing process for developing ROE adequately 
accommodate CNA? What can guide commanders, their warfighters, and op-
erational judge advocates in developing rules for computer network attack? Is 
this an area best left to policymakers inside the beltway or is there a role for 
crafting rules for CNA at the operational level-forward deployed, at sea, or in 
the field? This chapter considers the historical basis for ROE, identifies the fac-
tors that fold into ROE development for computer network attack, explores 
the considerations that might limit or empower a commander, and suggests an 
architecture for designing computer network attack ROE that may be em-
ployed throughout the conflict spectrum. By providing a "navigational chart" 
to many of these issues, the goal is to begin to demystify the process for com-
manders and decisionmakers alike. 
Historical ROE Development17 
Modem ROE have their roots in the naval and maritime tradition. With 
the advent of oar and sail, effective central control of a military asset by the 
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sending government was lost once a ship got underway from port. It was in-
cumbent upon the commanding officer to conduct the mission pursuant to the 
general guidance of the government. Virtually alone until the ship reached the 
ne:h.'t friendly port, or until the ship encountered another friendly vessel that 
could deliver news or orders, the commanding officer operated within broad 
parameters or rules issued by the leadership. The Continental Navy's first ex-
posure to rules governing operations occurred on January 5, 1776, when 
Commodore Esek Hopkins received written orders to engage British raiders 
that included a broad discretionary clause of authority: 
Notwithstanding these particular Orders, which 'tis hoped you will be able to 
execute, ifbad Winds or Stonny Weather, or any other unforeseen accident or 
disaster disable you so to do You are then to follow such Courses as your best 
Judgment shall Suggest to you as most useful to the American Cause and to 
distress the Enemy by all means in your power.1S 
Although modem technology has tremendously improved communication 
to underway vessels, naval vessels now routinely travel far from port, and transit 
much faster-sometimes even underwater-without access to detailed and real 
time guidance from a fleet commander or government leader. Prior to World 
War II, there was little need for a policy on use of force aside from occasional 
ships on diplomatic missions.19 Following World War II regulations governing 
the use of force, now known as rules of engagement, were promulgated in the 
1948 United States Navy Regulations with Article 0614, "Use of Force Against 
a Friendly State."20 In 1962 the first in a series of ROE were issued that applied 
Navy-wide. Written to address the unique challenges and special concerns aris-
ing from surface, undersea, and aviation operations throughout the maritime 
environment, these ROE were subsequently updated in 1970 and 1981.21 Even 
in the updated version, however, they still only applied to US naval forces. 
In 1986, the United States issued generalized JCS Peacetime ROE that, for 
the first time, included guidance for air and land forces.22 Two years later, fol-
lowing the experiences of the USS STARK (FFG-31) and USS VINCENNES 
(CG-49) in May 1987 and July 1988 respectively, the Peacetime ROE were 
again updated and revised. In 1994, a major revision was accomplished, and the 
ROE that applied to all US forces were promulgated by the Chairman of the 
Joint ChiefS of Staff as the Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces 
(SROE)23 Aside from the obvious title change that removed the "peacetime" 
reference, the 1994 document not only streamlined the ROE drafting and ap-
proval process, but also contained significant revisions, including a more 
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uniform approach. Separate ROE issued by the combatant Com-
manders-in-Chief (CINCs)24 augment the SROE, and are referenced as "the-
ater-specific" ROE.25 This marked a break from past practice, in which each 
CINC had a theater-wide top-to-bottom set of rules. Also, the 1994 SROE 
clarified a commander's inherent right and obligation of self-defense, and artic-
ulated a bright-line distinction between self-defense and the use of force for 
mission accomplishment. For self-defense, the SROE are firmly grounded in re-
sponding to a hostile act or responding to a demonstration of hostile intent. One 
of the more significant changes was the declassification of the basic self-defense 
SROE provisions. This enhanced training and application throughout US 
forces and enabled better coordination between allies and coalition partners. 
The most recent iteration of the SROE was released on January 15, 2000.26 
This latest version further refines and clarifies the concepts contained in earlier 
editions. It is comprised mainly of thirteen enclosures, including a separate en-
closure for Information Operations. Unlike the 2000 revision, the 1994 edition 
contained little substantive mention of CNA, sticking mostly to definitional 
terms and basic concept statements. Under the SROE, use ofCNA may be au-
thorized to a commander under the umbrella of the mission ROE provisions and 
the international law of armed conflict (LOAC), subject to any additional supple-
mental authorizations or restrictions received from higher authority.27 
Even though commanders of forces tasked to accomplish an operation or 
mission might be authorized CNA as a means of warfare, that does not mean 
they will decide to use it. Historically, personnel in the fleet or field did not ques-
tion the ROE they were provided. Often, ROE were not well-understood 
within theater, or at the tactical level. Moreover, there was a sense that the ROE 
dictated from above could not be changed and were to be applied without ques-
tion.28 This was demonstrated during the 1981 Gulf of Sidra freedom of naviga-
tion operation off the coast of Libya. Prior to the operation, orders issued to the 
Navy F-14s restrained those forces from responding to indications of hostile in-
tent even though the ROE in effect at the time authorized self-defense in re-
sponse to hostile intent.29 Another instance occurred during the bombing of the 
Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Headquarters building in Beirut, Leba-
non, in 1983, when a local commander's interpretation of the ROE led to orders 
for "sentries to keep their magazines in their ammunition pouches as a precau-
tion against an accidental or over-eager discharge of a weapon that might kill or 
wound one of the thousands of Lebanese civilians who visited the airport 
daily."30 
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Innovation, Military Doctrine, and ROE 
Limitations on the use of CNA may also fall victim to unnecessary restraint 
due to several factors. First, the complex and typically highly classified nature of 
CNA tools may not inspire confidence in commanders. They may be hesitant to 
rely upon bare promises that certain CNA tools can accomplish a mission, such 
as taking down an air defense site, when proven alternatives, such as air strikes or 
cruise missiles, are available. Commanders likely will have had training and ex-
perience with kinetic methods, but may not understand or appreciate CNA. 
During the 2000 Global War Game at the Naval War College, this dynamic was 
repeated by commanders who tended to move away from more speculative in-
struments toward those which were more familiar. 'This tendency toward tradi-
tional and proven methods of warfare has been demonstrated in war games of 
other services as well. Nevertheless, the war games also showed that US com-
manders were becoming more willing to adopt innovative methods to accom-
plish the mission, even when the methods lack historical record. 
The military services are beginning to realize that to gain acceptance as a via-
ble weapon system, the secretive nature of the tools must be reduced to a more 
accessible classified level so that commanders and their staffi and subordinate 
commands can familiarize themselves with the systems. Consider the develop-
ment of the machine gun more than one hundred years ago. An American, 
Richard J. Gatling, patented and demonstrated a reliable, multi-barreled re-
peating gun in 1862, but the Belgian-invented and French-developed 
mitrailleuse was the first combat-tested machine gun.31 On the eve of the 
Franco-Prussian war, the 11 mm mitrailleuse, recognized by the French army as 
a technical breakthrough in firepower, was kept in such tight secrecy in peace-
time that very few French officers could discuss or develop doctrine or tactics for 
its use on the battlefield.32 The weapon, which came as a complete surprise to 
the Germans, had the potential to swing victory to the French. Instead, advan-
tage was lost because the French were caught up in marveling at the technical as-
pects of development without devising correspondingly effective doctrine and 
tactics for the weapon.33 Similarly, although the Germans, British, and French 
were developing and fielding battle tanks during 1915-1916, they were ineffec-
tively and wastefully employed on the battlefield. It was not until a coherent 
doctrine for their employment was developed-most notably by the innovative 
British strategist Major J.F.C. Fuller-that the tank was accepted as a viable 
weapon rather than a curiosity. On November 20, 1917, a spearhead of 476 
British tanks penetrated German lines during the Battle of Cambrai, demon-
strating that the armored vehicles could achiev~ rapid and complete command 
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of dug-in defenses.34 Inertia prevents change, and we cannot assume that mili-
tary commanders in the present day are immune from this phenomenon. Just as 
in the examples cited above, bringing ROE for computer network attack from 
the general and theoretical to the specific and concrete will help commanders 
migrate to computer warfare. 
The method by which CNA will accomplish its end result likewise needs to 
be eA-plained to commanders, and commanders need to be able to engage in pro-
fessional debate on the subject. The ROE relate to the underpinning interna-
tional and domestic authority for using CNA, the scope of the commander's 
authority within the context of the national and theater commander's mission, 
and the conditions, if any, in which CNA is considered a lawful attack. One es-
pecially important consideration is the potential for collateral effects of CNA in 
view of the law of armed conflict. How might CNA affect third countries or 
neutral forces beyond the scope of the conflict? What might be the effect on civil 
societies, civilian populations, businesses, and related public and private infra-
structure? What impact might CNA have on protected persons or locations, 
such as sick and wounded personnel near the battle area or sites representing reli-
gious or cultural heritage? What about the effect on prisoners of war (POWs) 
and other protected classes of personnel, such as medical or religious personnel? 
Any anticipated or probable primary or secondary civilian injury or damage 
must be reviewed to determine whether it is excessive or disproportionate to the 
military advantage to be gained. Commanders are coming to view these issues 
personally and \vith growing interest since they bear the ultimate responsibility 
for the consequences of an attack. The trend toward creating universal multilat-
eral "war crimes" jurisdiction only serves to exacerbate many commanders' un-
easiness toward command and personal liability. 
The first step is for a commander to be able to understand the foreseeable 
consequences of a CNA attack, including damage or disruption to non-military 
systems. A review of the potential consequences within the ROE and LOAC 
framework is essential to forming a decision on the use of CNA. In particular, 
commanders must estimate the expected military benefit of CNA, and weigh 
that calculation against the collateral costs of attack. Ideally, the commander 
should be supported by an ROE cell that can present a menu of options. The 
cell should include representatives from the operations, intelligence and 
plans directorate, as well as a judge advocate. The cell should analyze ROE, 
targeting and politico-military issues associated with CNA, and deliver recom-
mendations to the commander. 
Commanders are rightly hesitant to employ unproven systems as one critical 
component of a coordinated attack because if the CNA component fails, then 
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the entire effort is imperiled. Inherent risk is already attendant to real world mis-
sions without the injection of an unproven, and possibly speculative system. 
Doubt as to legality and ROE would only serve to magnify these concerns. 
Compounding this problem may be the short life span of the attack due to rapid 
advance in technology and creative enemy adaptation. Even more so than con-
ventional weapons systems, once the impact of a particular CNA has been e=-''Pe-
rienced, adversaries can be expected to devise a tailored defense, thereby 
limiting future effectiveness.35 Moreover, the comparatively low cost and global 
availability of computer systems and trained programmers enables terrorist 
groups or developing nations to enter the realm of information and computer 
warfare. All of these factors serve to keep CNA tools underutilized, thereby 
foregoing potential military benefit. Doing so deprives a commander of the op-
portunity to observe its effectiveness in training or on lesser targets prior to ap-
plying it to a major target. A successful laboratory demonstration is not likely to 
do much to dissuade this opinion. As legal analysis continues to lag technological 
breakthrough, we can expect that without great attention, the development of 
mission-specific ROE for ever newer computer network attack systems will be a 
challenge. 
Understanding this background, proponents of the new technology are begin-
ning to realize that not only must they be able to adequately e=-''Plain and demon-
strate CNA, but they must also ensure that the commander understands how it 
functions. Computer network warfare and information operations are upsetting 
the existing Westphalian paradigm of warfare upon which traditional ROE and 
law of war are based. The very nature of CNA is rapidly changing. For instance, 
some suggest that the architecture of CNA is migrating from the traditional model 
of "waves" of attack to a model based on a simultaneous "swarming" or overtak-
ing of an opponent's system. "Swarming occurs when the dispersed nodes of a 
network of small ... forces converge on a target from multiple directions. The 
overall aim is sustainable pulsing of a force or fire."36 Once in motion, swarm net-
works must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, dissever and redis-
perse, and then immediately recombine for a new pulse. In other words, 
information-age attacks may come in swarms rather than the more traditional 
waves.37 Such a paradigm shift could completely transform the way many ele-
ments of ROE are applied in computer network attack. The concepts of "hostile 
act" and "hostile intent," for example, best fit a linear "wave" model, in which 
State action is directed toward another State in waves along a timeline-often be-
coming more permissive or aggressive as time lapses. Crisis war games bear this 
out; often, military exercises begin with a "Road to War" prelude of rising politi-
cal tensions that gradually escalate into military confrontation. Then, conflict 
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slowly accelerates from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The multilateral 
US-Thailand-Singaporean series of unclassified COBRA GOLD 00 and 01 exer-
cises were built from this model. Crafting suitable ROE for those scenarios ex-
posed the lack of flexibility inherent in a linear focus. 
Swanning attacks would pose, simultaneously, a confusing mixture of ac-
tions by a State or non-State actor against a State, with some actions perhaps 
tantamount to a "hostile act" or demonstration of "hostile intent." At the same 
time, other actions would fall below that threshold, confounding the develop-
mentofROE. 
The blurring of offense and defense reflects another feature of net-war: it tends to 
defy and cut across standard boundaries, jurisdictions, and distinctions between 
state and society, public and private, war and peace, war and crime, civilian and 
military, police and military, and legal and illegal. A government has difficulty 
assigning responsibility to a single agency-military, police, or intelligence--to 
respond.38 
Of course, this generates confusion over developing a common understanding of 
rules of engagement as the DoD vies with international and multilateral organi-
zations, international coalition partners, a host of other federal agencies, state and 
local law enforcement, and private business to develop ROE. Lines of authority 
will crisscross, and the "operational paradigms of politicians, officials, soldiers, 
police officers, and related actors get fuzzy and clash."39 In particular, the mili-
tary's ROE, which are developed for military operations, may conflict with 
other agencies' approaches, which are often based on law enforcement. These 
fundamental questions must be addressed before mission-specific legal analysis 
. can be thoroughly conducted. The essential law of armed conflict and general-
ized military rules of engagement for CNA, however, can be developed as a point 
of departure for policy and planning. This will enable commanders to begin a dia-
logue \vithin the defense establishment and with their counterparts outside 
the military, facilitating interagency cooperation and action. 
The ROE Process 
The SROE has added granularity to what many commanders had realized all 
along-that they are ultimately responsible for developing and applying ROE. 
This responsibility cannot be abrogated to the Staff Judge Advocate or other di-
rectorate. During crisis action planning, the Director of Operations (J3) is key to 
generating options and ranking the choices available to the commander. When 
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engaged in deliberate planning, the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy 0'5) is 
the central player. These directorates are closely assisted by the judge advocate, 
who serves as a facilitator to ensure that the principles of international and do-
mestic law are honored.4o Toward this end, subject matter experts are critical to 
forming meaningful ROE. Generally, the Director ofIntelligence 0'2) and the 
Director of Command, Control, Communications and Computers 0'6) are key 
advisors regarding CNA capabilities and limitations. 
Toward a Results-Based Model 
During the drafting process, a "results-based" approach to ROE should be 
given preference over broad grants of authority to engage in CNA. Results-
based ROE tie CNA into a specific mission type, along "vith the e}.-pected, as 
well as the desired, political or military effect. Using an air defense unit as an ex-
ample, CNA ROE might be written to authorize CNA to disable an air defense 
site for a specific period of time in order to accomplish one part of an overall mis-
sion. This could prove e}."tremely useful when the alternative of kinetic attack 
might release dangerous forces, physical destruction of the site is not required, or 
physical destruction might cause excessive collateral damage or adverse political 
consequences. CNA, by contrast relies upon a data stream to execute an attack, 
such as sending an attacking code to an air defense system computer, causing the 
power supply to short out. This is in contrast to using the electromagnetic spec-
trum, such as an electromagnetic pulse, that relies upon kinetic energy to obtain 
a similar result.41 
Many commanders are concerned about the delay required to obtain supple-
mental ROE approval, especially if the requested rules require NCA approval.42 
Duringjoint and combined exercises in the Western Pacific, scenario events typi-
cally overtook requests for supplemental ROE, as superseding events made the 
supplemental request irrelevant by unfolding scenario events. The same dynamic 
occurs in the real world, and the introduction of computer network attack ROE 
can only decelerate the process. One method that might speed this process along 
has been to request supplemental rules early in a scenario, delegating authorization 
to approve the ROE to a level closer to the commander ultimately charged "vith 
its use. For example, a combatant regional CINC might be delegated authority in 
advance for actions that would normally require NCA approval. Additionally, the 
supplemental ROE might be authorized pending occurrence of a certain set of 
events or tripwires. This type of thinking was evident in discussions "vith Austra-
lian operators and attorneys during Exercise TANDEM THRUST 99.43 In the 
Australian Defence Forces, this concept is called "dormant ROE," and it may 
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prove to be adaptable to CNA ROE. In "donnant ROE," a set of pre-authorized 
supplemental or mission-specific rules becomes effective upon some triggering 
event or receipt of a specialized code word. This method has the advantage of 
commanders being able to see in advance the level at which authorizations will be 
given depending upon how a particular mission develops, rather than waiting for 
change to occur during the mission. This avoids the commander having to address 
ROE that are suddenly inadequate, and ameliorates the need for additional rules in 
the midst of a crisis. It would also let the military personnel involved in the mission 
train for a change in ROE with the actual rules that would apply. Personnel famil-
iar with US and Australian ROE will quickly point out that while the American 
ROE are permissive in nature and US commanders feel comfortable with broad 
grants of authority without the need to have specific grants of authority, the Aus-
tralian rules are more restrictive. However, in dealing with CNA, US command-
ers should e},.-pect more restrictions. When a commander is granted authority to 
employ CNA, a limited authorization will most likely be the norm. This will be 
the case until such time as decision makers become more comfortable with this 
new method of warfare, and the ROE mature. One way to accomplish this, with-
out actual use in a conflict, is to better integrate CNA into war games and exer-
cises. In the last two years in particular, ROE addressing computer network attack 
and defense have begun to enter the exercise lexicon. Unfortunately, war games 
and exercises still rarely contain an ROE development phase where supplemental 
rules are discussed and developed. The concepts should be gravitating more 
quickly from the national or theater levels to the operational and battle group lev-
els. It is even rarer for the CNA procedures and effects to be explained, or the rules 
for their employment to be debated in the fleet. The highly classified nature of 
CNA serves to exacerbate this problem. 
Training and Gaming ROE 
Over the last two decades, the rules of engagement have matured consider-
ably. Captain]. Ashley Roach, USN (ret.) recognized the need for greater un-
derstanding of ROE and practice prior to conflict when he wrote nearly twenty 
years ago: 
There is a very real need for greater knowledge of rules of engagement on the part 
of strategy and policy personnel, tacticians and operators, and even by our civilian 
leaders. At present these rules are rarely, if ever, exercised and too few planners 
and commanders seek contingent approval for additional or relaxed rules.44 
407 
Computer Network Attack: Developing the Rules of Engagement 
Since that time, judge advocates and commanders have made great progress 
in integrating ROE with operations. Due to the rapid advance in capabilities 
and the explosion of computer networks in civil and military infrastructures 
throughout the globe, computer network attack has emerged as one of the few 
areas that require more immediate attention. Typically, when any type ofCNA 
is included in a war game or exercise, a judge advocate is given the task of craft-
ing ROE for their use, usually without operator input or a full understanding of 
the mission it is supporting. The problem oflawyer-operator decoupling during 
the drafting of ROE is certainly not unique to computer network attack issues. 
Nonetheless, the process of an attorney crafting ROE without the input of other 
staff representatives-the intelligence and operations directorates in particu-
lar-may yield rules that do not serve the commander's complete package of po-
litical and military goals. In exercises, CNA events often are handled 
"notionally." That is to say the "Blue" or "Red" team will state its intention to 
use CNA for an event, applying pre-authorized ROE developed prior to the 
game, and they will be informed by the exercise control group that the effort ei-
ther succeeded or failed. Even when a supplemental ROE request is sent up the 
chain-of-command to the NCA, there is usually no discussion of the actual 
method to be employed, making the event much more of a showcase assump-
tion than an actual exercise. Moreover, neither the Blue or Red force, or even 
the control group, has an understanding of the mechanics of the CNA and how 
it will operate, particularly the potential collateral effects-e:l>.l'ected or unex-
pected. Ideally, there will be a military attorney advising the exercise control 
group that can work with the control staff to determine legal effects of CNA. 
One part of this analysis that might benefit from more attention is whether CNA 
affects persons with protected or special status under international law. 
J'Train As We Type" 
No matter what shape the ROE begin to take, if we do not train like we actu-
ally anticipate utilizing a CNA tool, commanders may not have confidence in its 
use. Moreover, decision makers will lack confidence in their authorization. In-
crementally, progress on increased use ofCNA in war games and e:l>.l'eriments is 
unfolding, much like early use of the concept of responding in self-defense based 
upon a demonstration of hostile intent. Many might assume this concept has 
been around forever-but although it was adopted into early US ROE and ex-
pressed as an inherent right under individual and unit self-defense, this did not 
guarantee acceptance or use.45 Discussing the August 19, 1981, shoot-down of 
two Libyan Su-22 fighters by US Navy F-14s, Captain Roach observed: 
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It is a common misperception that under the peacetime ROE a commander must 
"take the first hit" and cannot act in self-defense until the opposing force has 
missiles away. That is not the law and is not required by our general peacetime 
ROE.46 
Interestingly, the tools and technologies for initiating computer network 
attack are e>"'Panding at a rapid pace, unsettling the associated ROE and com-
plicating the ability of attorneys and commanders alike to fashion widely ac-
cepted principles. On the other hand, through the process of incorporating 
CNA into realistic war games and experiments, the familiarity of future deci-
sion makers and commanders is increasing. Once CNA is an option available 
in time of crisis, deliberate planning during an armed conflict or other military 
operation will e>"'Pand the panoply of available tools for use by the com-
mander. This offers flexibility, asymmetric action, and potentially reduced ca-
sualties among both friendly forces and opponents alike. In tum, it promises 
to favorably mold the political outcome. 
Disciplining CNA 
The surest way to control the use of CNA is to keep its authorization at the 
NCA level. Doing so simplifies the decision making process for the commander 
in the field, but it does so at the expense of removing a flexible instrument from 
his or her inventory. This approach tends to move away from the traditional 
American position on ROE construction that empowers military commanders 
,vith all necessary authority to accomplish an assigned mission, so long as the 
ROE are not limited by higher authority.47 The goal should be to exercise and 
prepare task force and group commanders to engage opposing forces with com-
puter network attack, but to do so according to accepted criteria or rules. Thus, 
we need to migrate from an ad hoc approach to ROE for CNA to a more rou-
tine crisis action checklist appropriate for its employment. Any such checklist 
would have to be frequendy updated to reflect advances in computer technol-
ogy. Only by standardizing rules for initiating ROE will commanders become 
comfortable ,vith exercising independent judgment on how, when, where, and 
against whom to employ CNA. This requires judge advocates to convince com-
manders, and perhaps innovative technical developers, that computer network 
attack is properly analyzed within the traditional ROE and LOAC paradigm 
,vith which our leadership has grown accustomed. Of course, questions re-
main-and the dispositive issue of whether a computer network attack consti-
tutes a "use of force" (and if so, what kind of force)-looms large in the 
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background.48 Still, it would be shortsighted to await the resolution of this and 
other politico-legal debates before the military begins to think about a legal 
model for computer network attack. With that in mind, the existing approach of 
rules of engagement, embedded within the law of armed conflict, has several ad-
vantages. The construct is familiar within the United States and abroad, and it is 
accepted as a global standard for ameliorating the effects of military operations. It 
is also flexible and adaptable, and reflects hundreds of years of developmental 
thinking, so it is a solid foundation on which to build. Most importandy, to the 
extent that the law of armed conflict has been respected and observed in times of 
conflict, it has alleviated suffering, limited destruction and spared civilian 
casualties. 
Law of Armed Conflict 
The basic framework for all discussions of the laws of armed conflict center 
around the four principles that evolved from customary international law and 
subsequendy codified in the Hague and Geneva Conventions. These principles 
are: military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and chivalry. They frame all 
military activities in armed conflict, and thus must be understood by policy mak-
ers and war fighters alike. Military necessity is a cornerstone principle of military 
action. A commander may employ only that degree and kind offorce, not other-
wise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, required for the partial or complete 
submission of the enemy. A minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical re-
sources may be applied.49 
As reflected in Article 49 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, distinction ensures "respect for and protection of the civilian popula-
tion and civilian objects .... "50 Article 51 protects civilian populations, and 
51(4) defines unlawfully indiscriminate attacks as: (a) those which are not di-
rected at a specific military objective; (b) those which employ a method or 
means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) 
those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot 
be limited as required by Protocol 1. Consequendy, military strikes must distin-
guish between lawful combatants and civilians. 51 It would be a violation of 
LOAC to use civilians or a protected place or property to shield combatants or a 
valid military objective. The presence of civilians within or near a legitimate 
military target does not make an attack unlawful. 
In the fog of modem war, in which a State's entire society becomes vested 
in warfare, it is especially difficult to distinguish between lawful and unlawful 
targets: 
410 
Brian T. O'Donnell and James C. Kraska 
One related issue is the e:x1:ent that commanders could order preemptive or 
responsive attacks against non-state targets. It's not just the military. The Chinese, 
for example, put a lot of emphasis on people's infonnation warfare-encouraging 
individuals to use their own technology to annoy and attack others.52 
As we enter the computer warfare age, nations will attempt to further exploit this 
difficulty. 
Loss of life and damage to property incidental to attack must not be excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. 
This concept of proportionality defines "concrete and direct" military advan-
tage as "the advantage anticipated from the specific military operation of which 
the attack is a part taken as a whole and not from isolated or particular parts of the 
operation. "53 Collateral damage and incidental injury have historically been the 
product of three factors: (1) a lack offull knowledge as to what is being hit; (2) 
the inability to surgically craft the amount of force being applied to the target; 
and (3) the inability to ensure that the weapon strikes precisely the right point. 54 
On the digital batdefield, collateral damage could affect entire sectors of the 
economy and society. 
Finally, the main tenets of chivalry center around the principles of treachery 
and perfidy. The 1977 Additional Protocol I bans " ... acts inviting the confi-
dence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entided to, or is obliged to 
accord, protection under the rules ofinternationallaw applicable in armed con-
flict, \vith intent to betray that confidence .... "55 
Perfidy includes: 1) feigning of intent to negotiate or surrender, 2) feigning 
incapacitation, 3) feigning civilian, noncombatant status, and 4) feigning pro-
tected status by use of signs or uniforms of the UN or neutral states. Ruses, how-
ever, are not prohibited in an armed conflict. 56 Legitimate ruses include 
camouflage, deceptive lighting, decoys, mock operations, simulated forces and 
use of enemy codes and passwords. 57 These long-standing principles of intern a-
tionallaw have direct bearing on possible future CNAs that might rely upon 
e-mail delivery. One author has advanced the premise that: 
While chivalry may seem archaic today, it retains some nonnative value ... [by] 
analogy [it] strongly weighs against sending a logic bomb disguised as e-mail from 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRe) or even from "Microsoft 
Software Support" .... [S]uch a message might be permissible without perfidious 
labels. Using ICRC and Microsoft tags would constitute an illegitimate act of 
perfidy, much as would disguising any dangerous military intruder in the fonn of 
an innocuous invitee.58 
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With the principles ofLOAC in mind, a commander must also possess addi-
tional information prior to requesting permission for, or directing, a CNA. As a 
practical matter, the commander must know the target-is it a network, link, fa-
cility or person? He or she must also understand the effect-both military and 
cascading or collateral-the CNA will cause. 
What is the Target? 
Determining the target, and evaluating its lawfulness, will continue to be a fo-
cus of rules of engagement, and attacks against information systems are no excep-
tion. Whether the target is purely military or civilian, or nominally civilian but 
intertwined with military purposes or uses (dual-use) is central to this analysis. In 
the computer network attack realm, achieving "Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition" (SCADA) over a target is often the objective. SCADA is the com-
puter control of a power system, railroad or sewer system, or fresh water system. 
Over the last twenty years, the US military has relied more on targeting dual-use 
infrastructure systems. As this infrastructure becomes modernized and networked 
in most nations throughout the world, reaching system SCADA on a variety oflu-
crative targets is quickly becoming a milestone in any military operation. 59 At least 
one proponent has argued that the targeting of electric power distribution and ci-
vilian bridges is a violation of Additional Protocol!. 60 The Basic Rule of Article 
48 states, "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population 
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between 
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objec-
tives." Article 51 (4) states, "Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited."61 Article 51 (2) 
states: "The civilian population as such as well as individual civilians shall not be 
the object of attacks. Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is 
to spread terror among the civilian population, are prohibited. "62 
Cascading Effects 
Other than the desired military impact, what other probable and possible 
effects-cascading effects-can the CNA cause? Once such effects are assessed, 
the principle of proportionality must be examined. This would require an 
analysis of whether civilian systems will be affected. Is any damage excessive in 
light of the definite military advantage anticipated? What is the threshold of al-
lowable civilian damage? Are there alternative means available to accomplish 
the mission? 
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Getting these answers is the toughest part of the process. Intelligence 
might be lacking, collateral effects may not be clearly understood, and the in-
frastructure being attacked may not be fully comprehended. Uncertainty is 
the order. In some ways, a CNA could be considered like a kinetic, indirect 
fire weapon. Firing a weapon into an area, even during combat, without 
proper intelligence, observation, and identification of valid targets is generally 
unlawfu1.63 In much the same way, launching a CNA without sufficient un-
derstanding of the system being attacked would be improper. Add to that the 
fact that the weapon itself, in this case a CNA tool, and its effects on a given 
target system and other linked collateral systems may be poorly understood. 
That is not to say that the CNA tool will not have been reviewed prior to be-
ing placed in inventory-for the United States and many other nations, it is a 
prerequisite that a weapons review be accomplished prior to it being autho-
rized for use.64 However, unlike a hand grenade, CNA might have different 
effects depending upon the system it is launched against. Additionally, as tech-
nology changes, CNA might not have the same effect originally anticipated. 
Also of concern, due to the complex nature of computer programming and 
principles, is how the commander in the field will ever hope to reach the 
same level of understanding as computer and policy experts. Can he rely 
upon another's judgment when he is the one "pulling the trigger" by pressing 
the keyboard? Will this satisfy his requirements under international law? 
What is the minimum level of knowledge the commander must possess? 
Must the commander-
• understand what the targeted system does and how it operates? 
• understand how and what CNA will do to the targeted system? 
• be in a position, either through intelligence or direct observation, to judge 
the effects of the attack? 
• determine what other systems share or are linked to the target system and 
how those other systems operate and what they control? 
• determine what impact the CNA tool will have on the non-targeted 
shared or linked system? 
Blurring Lines: CNA ROE for Self-Defense 
Up to this point we have concentrated mainly on CNA ROE for mission ac-
complishment. However, a brief discussion of the use of CNA in self-defense is 
worthy of examination. 
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The 2000 SROE position on actions for self-defense seems to be clear: 
"These rules do not limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to 
use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-de-
fense of the commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity."65 
It follows, then, that ifCNA has been placed into the available inventory of 
weapons, it would be available for actions in self-defense, subject only to au-
thorization by higher authority. Does the novelty of the weapon or the peri-
odic comparison of CNA to a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)66 alter the 
conditions precedent for the exercise of self-defense, namely necessity and 
proportionality?67 If the CNA use conforms to the four LOAC principles, 
then characterizing CNA as a WMD is a dubious analogy. Although CNA is, 
at least for the present, a novelty, it does not require creation of an entirely 
new ROE. The unfamiliarity with CNA, the secrecy with which it is treated, 
and, perhaps most importantly, the misperceptions it may cause, could in-
crease provocation and escalation. The SROE already stretches to accommo-
date these considerations.68 However, taking CNA off the table for 
self-defense may be restricting an otherwise valid option for self-defense. If 
specifically tailored, CNA has the potential to remove or counter a hostile act 
or hostile intent threat in a "human-friendly" fashion. Unlike a kinetic 
weapon, CNA can disable systems without injuring civilians. 
Concluding Comment 
This chapter focuses on the process of developing rules of engagement for 
CNA within the greater context of the international law of armed conflict. It 
does not address the general lawfulness ofCNA in international law, except as it 
bears on use of force, targeting, and the ROE process. That question is largely 
academic, often lying outside the immediate needs of the operational com-
mander and forward-deployed judge advocate. Moreover, much of the analysis 
to date, tends toward the theoretical and thus is of greater interest and utility to 
scholars than operational commanders. 
By offering some practical principles for developing ROE, we hope to be-
gin closing the gulf between theoretical discussions of CNA and its opera-
tional application by theater and task force commanders. The ROE process 
includes developing the rules within the context of the law, doctrine, and 
force structure, as well as the boundaries of the mission. During the develop-
mental process, and throughout the application of CNA across the conflict 
spectrum, the commander should be personally involved. ROE drive CNA 
and have a dispositive effect on the political and military landscape. 
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